



INTERVIEWS WITH VICE-CHANCELLORS 
A1  TITLE 8 
 
A1.1 Introduction 
The University of Western Australia Human Research Ethics Committee 
approval was granted to interview Vice-Chancellors.  Potential Vice-Chancellors for 
interview were first contacted via email or letter asking if they would consent to an 
interview.  They were then sent information regarding the nature of the research 
undertaken, purpose of the interview and a list of potential questions.  This information 
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Dear [Title] [Name], 
 
THE MARKET FOR VICE-CHANCELLORS 
 
I am writing to you about an honours dissertation currently being undertaken at 
UWA by Lisa Soh on the market for Vice-Chancellors.  The objective of this project is 
to systematically investigate how this market functions, its relationship with governance 
of universities, and the links (if any) between the compensation of CEOs in the private 
sector and that of VCs.  I am supervising this dissertation, and I hope that it will provide 
considerable insight into these important issues. 
 
I wonder if you would agree to participate in a short interview regarding your 
experience as a Vice-Chancellor with Lisa, as part of her research.  A list of possible 
questions for the interview is attached.  The interview will last no longer than forty-five 
to sixty minutes, and Lisa will be contacting your office to arrange a meeting with you 
in the near future.   
  
  Lisa is an excellent student who is highly motivated.  She has a keen interest in 
this particular topic and will be happy to send you a copy of her dissertation once 
completed. 
 
This project has obtained approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee 
at the University of Western Australia. 
 
I thank you in advance for your time and participation in what I believe will be 
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This study is conducted as part of an 
Honours dissertation by: 
Lisa Soh 
6488-7078 
under the supervision of Professor Kenneth Clements. 
 
THE MARKET FOR VICE CHANCELLORS: INFORMATION SHEET 
The aims of this project are to answer the following: 
1.  How is performance measured in a university setting? 
2.  How does the market for vice-chancellors (VCs) of Australian universities 
work? 
3.  How good are university governance and management practices? 
4.  What are the determinants of pay for VCs? 
 
Participants will initially be contacted by the supervisor.  The purpose of this is to 
interview vice chancellors to gain a better understanding of their role within a university 
and to get better insight on their responsibilities.  This will take the form of an interview 
that is estimated to take between 30 minutes to one hour.  If necessary, the services of 
an interpreter or other third party may be used. 
 
Participants will be asked questions relating to their role as the vice chancellor.  They 
will be asked to express their views on the role of a vice chancellor, the responsibilities, 
the skills required, what they view as the most enjoyable part of the role, the least 
enjoyable, what a typical day is like, how their experience has helped them or otherwise 
in the role, how they came to the role and what their plans are for the future.   
Opportunities will be given for participants to ask questions or express their views on 
other topics. 
 
One possible benefit of the interview for the VCs is that it could enable them to allow 
them to educate the public of their role within the university and also to discuss the 
changing requirements of the role over time.  This will benefit the public as it informs 
them of what VCs can and cannot do and increases communication and transparency, 
which could only increase confidence in higher education institutions. 
 
Participants are free to withdraw consent to further participation at any time without 
prejudice in any way.  The participant need give no reason nor justification for such a 
decision.  In such a case, the record of the participant will be destroyed unless otherwise 
agreed by the participant. 
 
The data gathered from the interview will be used to write a dissertation on the market 
for vice chancellors.  Upon completion of the research the data will be kept by the 




MBDP  251 
35 Stirling Highway 
Crawley, Western Australia, 6009 
 
Telephone: (61 8) 6488-2898  
Facsimile: (61 8) 6488-1035 
Email: Ken.Clements@uwa.edu.au 
 
CRICOS Provider No 00126G 
  
150 
If participants have any questions concerning the research, all attempts will be made to 
answer them satisfactorily. 
 
Your participation in this study does not prejudice any right to compensation which you 













THE MARKET FOR VICE CHANCELLORS: CONSENT FORM 
 
I (the participant) have read the information provided and any questions I have asked 
have been answered to my satisfaction.  I agree to participate in this activity, realising 
that I may withdraw at any time without reason and without prejudice. 
 
I understand that all information provided is treated as strictly confidential and will not 
be released by the investigator unless required by law.  I have been advised as to what 
data is being collected, what the purpose is and what will be done with the data upon 
completion of the research. 
 
I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published provided my name or 




Participant      Date 
 
The Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Western Australia requires 
that all participants are informed that, if they have any complaint regarding the manner, 
in which a research project is conducted, it may be given to the researcher or, 
alternatively to the Secretary, Human Research Ethics Committee, 35 Stirling Highway, 
Crawley WA 6009 (telephone number 6488-3703).  All study participants will be 




LIST OF POSSIBLE QUESTIONS TO ASK 
 
1.  What does your role involve? 
2.  What would a typical day be like for you? 
3.  In what ways do you feel the role of a Vice-Chancellor has changed over time? 
4.  What would you say was your most challenging task?  Your most enjoyable? 
5.  I have read about your background prior to becoming a Vice-Chancellor.  Do you 
think that this has helped you in your role?  Are there aspects from your background 
that you find useful in applying in the role of a Vice-Chancellor?  In what areas do 
you think that your background has provided you with comparative advantage? 
6.  What do you think you will do after your time as a Vice-Chancellor? 
7.  In what ways do you think you have contributed during your tenure? 
8.  What is your long-term vision for the university? 
9.  In what areas do you feel this university has comparative advantage?  Where do you 
see its weaknesses? 
10. Who, in your opinion, would you consider to be effective Vice-Chancellor?  Which 
Vice-Chancellors in the past do you admire? 
11. What motivated you to apply for the role of a Vice-Chancellor? 
12. How does your role differ from that of the Chancellor? 
13. What characteristics would you say are important in a Vice-Chancellor? 
14. How do you feel corporate governance within the university has changed?  How do 
you envisage it to change in the future? 
15. Would you consider the role of a Vice-Chancellor to be similar at all universities 
worldwide? 
16. Do you feel that the decision making structure at the university is effective and 
efficient?  In what ways (if any) do you feel it could be improved? 
17. Do you perceive your role to be more/less difficult to that of a corporate CEO? 





B1  TITLE 9 
 
B1.1  Introduction 
Extensions are made to two of the regression models presented in this 
dissertation to check the sensitivity of the estimates to changes in ways of measuring 
variables. 
 
B1.2  Enrolments 
In Chapter 5 we related Vice-Chancellor remuneration to institution, geographic 
and personal variables.  The original results are given in Table 5.6.  We now redefine 
enrolments as equivalent full time student units (EFTSU) student numbers.  We also 
replace data on house prices with a location dummy variable.  This model is shown in 
equation (A2.1). 
 
( ) ( ) 12 3 i t4 i t it it
5 it 6 it 7 it 8 it
9 i t1 0 i t1 1 i t i t
log Remuneration log Assets Earnings ARC
Location Years Male Go8
Council EFTSU Staff
=α +α +α +α
+α +α +α +α
+α +α +α +ε
. (A2.1) 
 
EFTSU is likely to give a better measure of the managerial requirements of the 
institution than enrolments, as the latter measure equally weights all students regardless 
of their course load (full-time, part-time, etc.).  However, for those institutions that are 
dual-sector institutions, EFTSU will understate their enrolments as it excludes TAFE 
student load.  The location dummy variable is equal to one if the Vice-Chancellery is 
located outside the state/territory capital and zero otherwise.  This may indicate whether 
universities in remote locations have to pay a premium to attract a Vice-Chancellor to 
their institution, an argument that has been suggested (Anonymous, 2004).  Using house 
price data as a proxy for location is likely to pick up the opposite effect on 
remuneration, as house prices in capital cities are higher than in the rest of the state and 
due to the higher cost of living, it is expected that this would lead to a positive 
coefficient for capital cities relative to rural locations.  All other variables are 




DETERMINANTS OF VICE-CHANCELLOR REMUNERATION 
USING EFTSU AND LOCATION DUMMY VARIABLE 
( ) ( ) 12 3 i t4 i t it it
5i t 6 i t 7 i t 8 i t
9 i t1 0 i t1 1 i t i t
log Remuneration log Assets Earnings ARC
Location Years Male Go8
Council EFTSU Staff
=α +α +α +α
+α +α +α +α
+α +α +α +ε
 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable 1998-2002  2001-2002 
(1) (2)  (3) 
Intercept  11.09 (1.03)  10.76 (1.83) 
Assets  .10 (.08)  .14 (.14) 
Location  -.02 (.07)  -.09 (.12) 
ARC (
4 10
− × )  .13 (.74)  .06 (.13) 
Earnings (
7 10
− × )  .66 (.64)  .21 (.94) 
Council (
2 10
− × )  .34 (.85)  .45 (1.32) 
Go8  .30 (.13)  .62 (.23) 
Male  -.02 (.07)  -.07 (.13) 
EFTSU (
4 10
− × )  .21 (.08)  .28 (.14) 
Staff (
3 10
− × )  -.18 (.08)  -.31 (.14) 
Years  .02 (.01)  .02 (.01) 
2 R  .39 .32 
df 84  37 
 
Looking at the column 2 of Table B2.1, when the new variables are used, the 
signs of the coefficients do not change from the original model, but the goodness of fit 
increases.  Size as measured by total assets is no longer significant, although if taken at 
face value, the marginal effect of an increase in assets evaluated at the means is similar 
to the original model, being an increase in Vice-Chancellor remuneration of 5 cents (on 
average) per one thousand dollar increase in the asset base.  What is significant in this 
model is the number of students measured by EFTSU, consistent with the results of 
Ehrenberg et al. (2001) who use enrolments as their size proxy.  The coefficient of the 
EFTSU variable is 
4 .21 10
− × , which implies that an increase in student load of one 
hundred will lead to a .21 percent increase in remuneration, on average.  There is a 
negative and significant relationship between Vice-Chancellor remuneration and the 
number of staff, an odd result, as it suggests that as the employee base increases, Vice-
Chancellor remuneration falls.  This is inconsistent with tournament theory, which  
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suggests a larger differential in order to motivate employees to increase productivity.  
However, the analysis of the process of Vice-Chancellor appointment, discussed in 
Section 5.3, found little evidence to support tournament theory. 
 
Just as in the original model, there is no evidence of a significant gender 
premium or regional effects in Vice-Chancellor remuneration setting.  The coefficient 
on the location dummy variable, while negative, is not significant, indicating that there 
is little evidence of a premium offered as an incentive for Vice-Chancellors to accept 
the role at more remote institutions.  The Group of Eight dummy variable is positive and 
significant, suggesting that these institutions offer a premium to their Vice-Chancellors.  
Perhaps these institutions offer higher remuneration in an attempt to signal their quality 
and attract higher quality candidates.  The coefficient is .30, which when converted to a 
percentage premium translates to the Group of Eight institutions paying their Vice-
Chancellors 35 percent more on average than non-Group of Eight institutions.  The 
coefficient on ARC funding is positive and significant, suggesting that institutions with 
greater research capacity offer higher compensation to their Vice-Chancellors.  As ARC 
funding is allocated on a competitive basis, this may reward Vice-Chancellors for their 
success in stimulating an environment that is able to generate alternative sources of 
funding for the institution. 
 
Column 3 of Table B2.1 controls for the potential incompatibility of ARC 
funding data.  While the signs of the coefficients are unchanged, only the Group of 
Eight, EFTSU and staff variables are now significant.  Taken with the original results, it 
appears that size is a determinant of Vice-Chancellor remuneration, however the proxy 
for size is not clear cut.  There also appears to be some evidence of a Group of Eight 
premium where Vice-Chancellors at these institutions receive higher remuneration than 
their counterparts at other institutions.  The premium is now larger, at 88 percent higher 
remuneration, on average, than non-Group of Eight institutions.  Perhaps this reflects 
the increased complexity of managing one of these institutions or alternatively, the 
higher premium in the later period is not inconsistent with these institutions using 
remuneration as a mechanism to signal their prestige as reputation effects become more 
important over time. 
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B1.3  Offshore Students 
A final check done on this model is to replace total student EFTSU with onshore 
student EFTSU.  As more institutions establish campuses offshore, it is interesting to 
consider what would be the expected effect on remuneration if these offshore students 
were to transfer to the corresponding Australian campus.  If there is no effect on 
remuneration, then the geographic location of students does not matter.  However, if 
offshore students are somehow less than equivalent to onshore students then they should 
be excluded from the model.  This will be a more important consideration for those 
institutions with greater emphasis on offshore campus activities.  As this data is only 
available from 2001, the model is estimated for the period 2001-2002 only.  The results 
are shown in Table B2.2.  The coefficients are the same sign and of comparable 
magnitude to those in the third column of Table B2.1, suggesting that the geographic 
location of students does not matter when setting Vice-Chancellor remuneration.  This 
result could possibly be interpreted as saying that if the Vice-Chancellor were solely 
concerned with increasing remuneration, as it may be “cheaper” (at least in the short 
run) to enrol offshore students, this may be an attractive strategy to pursue. 
 
Table B2.2 
DETERMINANTS OF VICE-CHANCELLOR 
REMUNERATION USING ONSHORE EFTSU 
() ( )
()
12 3 i t4 i t it it
5i t 6 i t 7 i t 8 i t
9i t 1 0 1 1 i t i t it
log Remuneration log Assets Earnings ARC
Location Years Male Go8
Council OnshoreEFTSU Staff
=α +α +α +α
+α +α +α +α
+ α+ α + α + ε
 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable Value 
Intercept 10.64  (1.82) 
Assets .16  (.14) 
Location DV  -.09 (.12) 
ARC (
5 10
− × )  .45 (1.29) 
Earnings (
7 10
− × )  .16 (.94) 
Council (
2 10
− × )  .36 (1.31) 
Go8 .59  (.22) 
Male -.08  (.13) 
Onshore EFTSU (
4 10
− × )  .28 (.15) 
Staff (
3 10
− × )  -.30 (.14) 
Years .01  (.01) 




B1.4  Termination Payments 
In Chapter 5 we compared the remuneration of Vice-Chancellors to that of 
CEOs.  The original results are in Table 5.11.  We now re-estimate the equation with a 
dummy variable for turnover years.  This controls for possible outliers due to 
termination payments.  The other possibility that may occur in turnover years in 
universities is potential understatement of remuneration where the term of the Vice-
Chancellor is only for part of the year and the amount paid (rather than payable) is 





it 0 1 2 it 3 4 it it it logy log revenue VC TO TO =β +β +β +β +β +ε , (A2.2) 
i universities and companies ∈ . 
 
For institution i in year t ,  y is remuneration; revenue is total revenue (in 
thousands); VC is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for a Vice-Chancellor 
and zero otherwise; TO is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 when turnover 
occurs and zero otherwise; and ε is a random error term.  To control for the effects of 
inflation, remuneration and revenues are expressed in constant 1996 dollars.  The results 
are shown in Table B2.3. 
 
Table B2.3 shows that when turnover is controlled for, there is little change from 
the original results and the interpretation presented in Table 5.11.  The turnover 
dummies are positive but not significant, suggesting that in turnover years Vice-
Chancellors and CEOs do not receive significantly higher remuneration, contrary to the 
common belief that the departure of top management is always accompanied by a large 
termination payment.  This view is also shared by Charles Macek, Chairman of the 
Financial Reporting Council, who believes that termination payments are being 
moderated as governing bodies implement corporate governance practices that look 
more closely at the basis through which management is remunerated (Mellish, 2004). 
 
B1.5  Over/Underpayment 
Table B2.4 gives the average over time of the residuals from the model in Panel 
A of Table B2.3 converted into percentages for each institution; this, like the original  
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results in Table 5.12 represents the average percentage over/underpayment to the Vice-
Chancellor relative to what is expected on the basis of size.  The rankings are mostly 
unchanged from the original table and the magnitude of over/underpayment is also 
similar.  The general effect of adding controls for turnover is to decrease (increase) the 
magnitude of relative over/underpayment for those institutions where turnover has (not) 
occurred over the sample period, although the changes are small.  This is to be expected 
given the coefficient on the turnover dummy variable is positive but not significant.  
Overall, there appears to be no evidence of systematically large termination payments 
when Vice-Chancellor turnover occurs. 
 
Table B2.3 
VICE-CHANCELLOR VERSUS CEO REMUNERATION 
INCLUDING TURNOVER DUMMY VARIABLE 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable/Coefficient Value




it 0 1 2 3 it it it
company university
4i t 5i t i t
logy log revenue log revenue VC
TO TO
=α +α +α +α
+α +α +ε
 
Intercept   0 α   8.57 (.37)    
()
company log revenue    1 α   .40 (.03)  
()
university log revenue   2 α   .26 (.05)  
VC   3 α   .78 (.74)  
company TO    4 α   .27 (.20)  
university TO    5 α   .14 (.11) .77  297
B.   ( )
company university
it 0 1 2 it 3 it 4 it it it logy log revenue VC TO TO =β +β +β +β +β +ε  
Intercept   0 β   8.94 (.33)    
() log revenue    1 β   .37 (.02)    
VC   2 β   -.90 (.07)  
company TO    3 β   .26 (.20)  
university TO    4 β   .13 (.11) .76  298
C.  
( ) it 0 1 2 it 3 it it
company university
4i t 5i t i t
logy log revenue VC Go8
TO TO
=γ +γ +γ +γ
+γ +γ +ε
 
Intercept   0 γ   8.81 (.35)  
() log revenue    1 γ   .38 (.02)  
it VC    2 γ   -.86 (.08)  
Go8   3 γ   -.11 (.09)   
159 
company TO    4 γ   .26 (.20)  
university TO    5 γ   .13 (.11) .76  297
F statistic for  12 α= α is 5.21 (p-value .02).  
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Table B2.4 
PERCENT RELATIVE OVER/UNDER PAYMENT OF VICE-CHANCELLORS 
MODELLED WITH CONTROL FOR TURNOVER 
 Institution  % Institution  %
1. Curtin University of Technology  -16.1 18. Deakin University  1.3
2. Australian National University  -14.1 19. Victoria University  2.9
3. Edith Cowan University  -12.2 20. La Trobe University  4.2
4. James Cook University  -10.5 21. University of Western Australia 5.1
5. RMIT  -8.5 22. University of New England  6.4
6. University of Technology Sydney  -8.1 23. Central Queensland University  7.7
7. University of Melbourne  -7.5 24. QUT  7.9
8. University of Newcastle  -7.4 25. University of Sydney  12.2
9. Murdoch University  -6.5 26. University of Canberra  13.0
10. University of Tasmania  -6.3 27. Southern Cross University  21.9
11. University of Southern Queensland  -5.4 28. Monash University  23.2
12. University of New South Wales  -4.9 29. University of Wollongong  23.2
13. Charles Sturt University  -4.2 30. University of Western Sydney  24.7
14. Swinburne University of Technology -2.0 31. University of Adelaide  30.8
15. University of Ballarat  -1.8 32. USC  39.6
16. Australian Catholic University  -1.2 33. Macquarie University  47.1
17. Griffith University  .2 34. University of Queensland  54.0
 
 
B1.6  Summary 
In remuneration setting for Vice-Chancellors, there do not appear to be any 
regional effects.  Vice-Chancellors do not receive significantly higher remuneration for 
living in capital cities where the cost of living is higher, nor do universities offer higher 
remuneration in order to attract Vice-Chancellors to more remote locations.  The size 
(or customer base) of the institution, measured by EFTSU, appears to have a small but 
significant impact on remuneration.  Additionally, the geographical location of the 
student does not seem to matter, which suggests that there is no significant differential 
in the complexity of managing onshore and offshore students.  Finally, the debate 
concerning excessive termination payments does not seem to be a serious concern in the 
market for Vice-Chancellors, as analysis shows that turnover is not systematically 





DATA USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
C1  TITLE 10 
 
C1.1  Introduction 
This appendix presents the data used for the regression models estimated in the 
dissertation.  For further information on the source of this data, see Chapter 3 and for 
finer detail on the data, see the attached CD. 
 
C1.2  Earnings Persistence 
In Chapter 4, we related earnings in period t1 +  to those in year t  and also 
broke this down into cash flow from operations and accruals.  The equations estimated 
are shown below and the original results are available in Table 4.5.  The data is shown 
in Table C3.1. 
 
i , t1 0 1 i t i , t1 EE + + = α+ α + ε , 
it
n
i , t 101 i t2 i , t 1 EC F O A A ++ = β+ β + β + ε , n 1,2 =  
 
In these equations all variables scaled by average total assets. 
 
C1.3  Vice-Chancellor Tenure 
In Chapter 5, we modelled Vice-Chancellor tenure.  The original results are in 
Table 5.4.  The equation is shown below and the data is available in Table C3.2. 
 
it t it it it it logT Age Earnings Retire =α+β +γ +δ +λ +ε . 
 
C1.4  Vice-Chancellor Appointment 
The process of Vice-Chancellor appointment was investigated to see if it 
followed a tournament-theory like process using the following equation: 
 
( ) it it it it it it it OUT Staff Earnings VC log Assets Go8 =α+β +γ +δ +λ +θ +ε . 
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The original results are given in Table 5.5.  The data for the model is in Table C3.3. 
 
C1.5  Determinants of Vice-Chancellor Remuneration 
In Chapter 5, we related Vice-Chancellor remuneration to institution, geographic 
and personal characteristics.  Additionally, in Appendix A2, we extended the model by 
redefining enrolments as equivalent full time student units (EFTSU) and replacing 
house prices with a location dummy variable.  The original results are available in Table 
5.6 while Tables A2.1 and A2.2 contain the results using the redefined variables for 






12 3 i t4 i t it it
5 6 it 7 it 8 it it
9i t 1 0 i t 1 1 i t i t
log Remuneration log Assets Earnings ARC
log House Years Male Go8
Council Enrol Staff
=α +α +α +α
+α +α +α +α
+α +α +α +ε
. 
 
C1.6  Vice-Chancellor versus CEO Remuneration 
The remuneration of Australian Vice-Chancellors and CEOs was compared in 
Chapter 5 using the model 
 
( ) it 0 1 2 it it it logy log revenue D =β +β +β +ε , i universities and companies ∈ . 
 
Appendix A2 extended the analysis to include a control for turnover.  The original 
results are in Table 5.11 while Table A2.3 contains the results including the control for 






EARNINGS PERSISTENCE DATA 
 Institution  Year Earnings Cash Flow from Operations Accrual Measure 1 Accrual Measure 2
1. Australian National University  1997 .01  .04  -.03  -.03 
2. Australian National University  1998 .02  .04  -.02  .01 
3. Australian National University  1999 .00  .04  -.03  .01 
4. Australian National University  2000 .01  .04  -.03  -.01 
5. Australian National University  2001 .04  .04  .00  .06 
6. Australian National University  2002 -.01  .02  -.03  -.01 
7. Central Queensland University  1998 .09  -.23  .32  .39 
8. Central Queensland University  1999 .09  -.17  .26  .36 
9. Central Queensland University  2000 .04  -.13  .17  .25 
10. Charles Sturt University  1997 .03  -.17  .20  .25 
11. Charles Sturt University  1998 .01  .05  -.04  .02 
12. Charles Sturt University  1999 .01  .03  -.02  .04 
13. Charles Sturt University  2000 .01  .06  -.05  -.02 
14. Charles Sturt University  2001 .01  .07  -.06  -.02 
15. Charles Sturt University  2002 .04  .07  -.03  .08 
16. Curtin University of Technology  1997 .02  .01  .01  .32 
17. Curtin University of Technology  1998 .01  .02  .00  -.01 
18. Curtin University of Technology  1999 .01  .00  .01  .05 
19. Curtin University of Technology  2000 -.04  .00  -.05  -.03 
20. Curtin University of Technology  2001 .11  .01  .10  .12 
21. Curtin University of Technology  2002 .00  -.01  .01  .03 
22. Deakin University  1997 .05  -.19  .24  .33 
23. Deakin University  1998 .04  .07  -.03  .04 
24. Deakin University  1999 .04  .05  -.01  .06 
25. Deakin University  2000 .01  .04  -.03  .01 
26. Deakin University  2001 .02  .04  -.03  .03 
   Continued on next page… 
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Table C3.1 
EARNINGS PERSISTENCE DATA (continued) 
 Institution  Year Earnings Cash Flow from Operations Accrual Measure 1 Accrual Measure 2 
27. Deakin University  2002 .01  .07  -.06  -.01 
28. Edith Cowan University  1997 .01  .05  -.04  .00 
29. Edith Cowan University  1998 .02  .03  -.02  .01 
30. Edith Cowan University  1999 .01  .04  -.03  .02 
31. Edith Cowan University  2000 -.01  .01  -.02  .07 
32. Edith Cowan University  2001 .04  .04  -.01  .03 
33. Edith Cowan University  2002 .03  .04  -.01  .13 
34. Griffith University  2000 .00  .06  -.06  .05 
35. Griffith University  2001 .02  .07  -.05  .04 
36. James Cook University  1997 -.01  -.21  .20  .23 
37. James Cook University  1998 .03  .04  -.01  .01 
38. James Cook University  1999 .05  .07  -.02  .03 
39. James Cook University  2000 .05  .07  -.02  .04 
40. James Cook University  2001 .05  .09  -.04  .01 
41. James Cook University  2002 .02  .05  -.03  .01 
42. La Trobe University  1997 .04  -.25  .30  .37 
43. La Trobe University  1998 .03  .03  .00  .03 
44. La Trobe University  1999 .00  .04  -.03  .06 
45. La Trobe University  2000 .00  .05  -.06  .00 
46. La Trobe University  2001 -.01  .05  -.06  -.03 
47. La Trobe University  2002 .01  .06  -.05  -.01 
48. Macquarie University  1997 -.01  -.11  .10  .18 
49. Macquarie University  1998 .00  -.10  .09  .14 
50. Macquarie University  1999 .02  -.08  .11  .14 
51. Macquarie University  2000 .04  .05  -.02  .04 
52. Macquarie University  2001 .02  .06  -.04  .00 
   Continued on next page…  
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Table C3.1 
EARNINGS PERSISTENCE DATA (continued) 
 Institution  Year Earnings Cash Flow from Operations Accrual Measure 1 Accrual Measure 2
53. Macquarie University  2002 .05  .08  -.03  .02 
54. Monash University  1997 .04  -.19  .24  .30 
55. Monash University  1998 .03  .04  -.02  .04 
56. Monash University  1999 .03  .04  -.01  .02 
57. Monash University  2000 .03  .05  -.02  .03 
58. Monash University  2001 .01  .02  -.02  .03 
59. Monash University  2002 .00  .04  -.04  .00 
60. Murdoch University  1997 .06  .10  -.04  .05 
61. Murdoch University  1998 .04  .08  -.04  .02 
62. Murdoch University  1999 .01  .04  -.03  .03 
63. Murdoch University  2000 .00  .04  -.04  .00 
64. Murdoch University  2001 -.01  .04  -.05  -.03 
65. Murdoch University  2002 .01  .04  -.03  .00 
66. Northern Territory University  1997 .03  -.33  .36  .47 
67. Northern Territory University  1998 .03  -.30  .34  .40 
68. Northern Territory University  1999 -.01  .02  -.03  .00 
69. Northern Territory University  2000 .06  .10  -.04  .01 
70. Northern Territory University  2001 .03  .07  -.04  .00 
71. Northern Territory University  2002 -.05  -.01  -.04  -.01 
72. Queensland University of Technology  1998 .04  .06  -.03  .04 
73. Queensland University of Technology  1999 .01  .04  -.02  .04 
74. Queensland University of Technology  2000 .03  .05  -.03  .05 
75. Queensland University of Technology  2001 .02  .07  -.05  .01 
76. Queensland University of Technology  2002 .04  .11  -.07  .01 
77. RMIT  1997 .00  .06  -.06  .02 
78. RMIT  2002 .00  .03  -.03  .00 
   Continued on next page… 
165 
Table C3.1 
EARNINGS PERSISTENCE DATA (continued) 
 Institution  Year Earnings  Cash Flow from Operations Accrual Measure 1 Accrual Measure 2
79. Southern Cross University  1997 .12  -.22  .34  .40 
80. Southern Cross University  1998 .04  .06  -.01  .02 
81. Southern Cross University  1999 -.01  .00  -.01  .02 
82. Southern Cross University  2000 .04  .05  .00  .04 
83. Southern Cross University  2001 .02  .06  -.04  .02 
84. Southern Cross University  2002 .01  .04  -.03  .00 
85. Swinburne University of Technology  1997 .04  -.25  .29  .33 
86. Swinburne University of Technology  1998 .01  .06  -.05  .00 
87. Swinburne University of Technology  1999 .00  .04  -.03  .03 
88. Swinburne University of Technology  2000 .03  .08  -.05  .00 
89. Swinburne University of Technology  2001 .03  .05  -.02  .04 
90. Swinburne University of Technology  2002 .00  .06  -.05  .02 
91. University of Adelaide  1997 .03  -.22  .25  .28 
92. University of Adelaide  1998 .01  .04  -.03  .00 
93. University of Adelaide  1999 .01  .03  -.02  .03 
94. University of Adelaide  2000 .00  .03  -.02  .03 
95. University of Adelaide  2001 -.01  .02  -.03  .00 
96. University of Adelaide  2002 .02  .03  -.01  .02 
97. University of Ballarat  1997 .08  -.23  .31  .41 
98. University of Ballarat  1998 .05  .10  -.05  .02 
99. University of Ballarat  1999 .02  .05  -.03  .01 
100. University of Ballarat  2000 .01  .05  -.04  .00 
101. University of Ballarat  2001 .06  .11  -.05  .04 
102. University of Ballarat  2002 .04  .08  -.03  .05 
103. University of Canberra  1997 .02  -.40  .42  .51 
104. University of Canberra  1998 .01  -.15  .16  .19 
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Table C3.1 
EARNINGS PERSISTENCE DATA (continued) 
 Institution  Year Earnings Cash Flow from Operations Accrual Measure 1 Accrual Measure 2
105. University of Canberra  1999 .01  .04  -.03  .00 
106. University of Canberra  2000 .02  .06  -.04  -.01 
107. University of Canberra  2001 .01  .03  -.02  .00 
108. University of Canberra  2002 .00  .04  -.04  .00 
109. University of Melbourne  1997 .02  .04  -.02  .02 
110. University of Melbourne  1998 .01  .03  -.02  .00 
111. University of Melbourne  1999 .04  .04  .01  .09 
112. University of Melbourne  2000 .02  .03  -.01  .02 
113. University of Melbourne  2001 .03  .05  -.02  .04 
114. University of Melbourne  2002 .02  .05  -.02  .04 
115. University of New England  1997 .01  -.17  .18  .19 
116. University of New England  1998 .00  .04  -.04  -.03 
117. University of New England  1999 -.01  .02  -.03  -.02 
118. University of New England  2000 .01  .01  .00  .03 
119. University of New England  2001 .02  .04  -.02  .00 
120. University of New England  2002 .01  .04  -.03  -.01 
121. University of New South Wales  1997 .02  -.15  .17  .19 
122. University of New South Wales  1998 .01  -.16  .17  .23 
123. University of New South Wales  1999 .00  .04  -.04  .00 
124. University of New South Wales  2000 .05  .06  -.02  .00 
125. University of New South Wales  2001 .03  .05  -.02  .00 
126. University of New South Wales  2002 .03  .07  -.04  .01 
127. University of Newcastle  1997 .02  -.18  .21  .28 
128. University of Newcastle  1998 .04  .07  -.03  .03 
129. University of Newcastle  1999 .04  .06  -.02  .03 
130. University of Newcastle  2000 -.02  .03  -.05  -.01 
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Table C3.1 
EARNINGS PERSISTENCE DATA (continued) 
 Institution  Year Earnings Cash Flow from Operations Accrual Measure 1 Accrual Measure 2
131. University of Newcastle  2001 -.01  .04  -.05  -.01 
132. University of Newcastle  2002 -.01  .03  -.03  -.01 
133. University of Queensland  1997 .03  -.14  .17  .21 
134. University of Queensland  1998 .02  .04  -.02  .02 
135. University of Queensland  1999 .04  .06  -.02  .03 
136. University of Queensland  2000 -.02  .03  -.05  -.01 
137. University of Queensland  2001 -.01  .04  -.05  -.01 
138. University of Queensland  2002 -.01  .03  -.03  -.01 
139. University of South Australia  1997 .00  -.18  .17  .19 
140. University of South Australia  2001 .01  .04  -.03  -.01 
141. University of South Australia  2002 .02  .05  -.03  -.02 
142. University of Southern Queensland  1997 .02  -.33  .35  .43 
143. University of Southern Queensland  1998 -.01  -.27  .26  .37 
144. University of Southern Queensland  1999 -.01  -.30  .29  .30 
145. University of Southern Queensland  2000 -.01  -.33  .32  .36 
146. University of Southern Queensland  2001 .00  .02  -.02  .03 
147. University of Southern Queensland  2002 .00  .04  -.04  .01 
148. University of Sydney  1997 .00  -.09  .09  .11 
149. University of Sydney  1998 .01  .03  -.02  .00 
150. University of Sydney  1999 .01  .00  .01  .04 
151. University of Sydney  2000 .01  .03  -.02  .01 
152. University of Sydney  2001 .03  .05  -.01  .02 
153. University of Sydney  2002 .02  .05  -.03  -.03 
154. University of Tasmania  1997 .04  -.19  .23  .27 
155. University of Tasmania  1998 .03  -.19  .23  .34 
156. University of Tasmania  1999 .04  -.24  .28  .32 
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Table C3.1 
EARNINGS PERSISTENCE DATA (continued) 
 Institution  Year Earnings Cash Flow from Operations Accrual Measure 1 Accrual Measure 2
157. University of Tasmania  2000 .00  .04  -.04  .01 
158. University of Tasmania  2001 .01  .06  -.06  .02 
159. University of Tasmania  2002 .00  .04  -.04  .00 
160. University of Technology Sydney  1997 .03  -.15  .18  .25 
161. University of Technology Sydney  1998 .03  .05  -.02  .03 
162. University of Technology Sydney  1999 .04  .07  -.03  .02 
163. University of Technology Sydney  2000 .05  .06  -.02  .05 
164. University of Technology Sydney  2001 .02  .06  -.04  .08 
165. University of Technology Sydney  2002 .03  .04  -.02  .02 
166. University of Western Australia  1997 .03  .05  -.01  .03 
167. University of Western Australia  1998 .03  .03  .00  .06 
168. University of Western Australia  1999 .02  .02  -.01  .03 
169. University of Western Australia  2000 .02  .00  .02  .05 
170. University of Western Australia  2001 .02  .04  -.02  .01 
171. University of Western Australia  2002 .00  .02  -.02  -.02 
172. University of Western Sydney  1997 .03  -.18  .21  .26 
173. University of Western Sydney  1998 .00  .03  -.03  .01 
174. University of Western Sydney  1999 .01  .03  -.03  .01 
175. University of Western Sydney  2000 .02  .05  -.03  .02 
176. University of Western Sydney  2001 .01  .06  -.05  .01 
177. University of Wollongong  1997 .00  -.16  .17  .25 
178. University of Wollongong  1998 .00  .03  -.04  .01 
179. University of Wollongong  1999 .03  .07  -.04  .02 
180. University of Wollongong  2000 .01  .06  -.04  .03 
181. University of Wollongong  2001 .01  .08  -.07  .01 
182. University of Wollongong  2002 .02  .07  -.05  -.01 
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Table C3.1 
EARNINGS PERSISTENCE DATA (continued) 
 Institution  Year Earnings Cash Flow from Operations Accrual Measure 1 Accrual Measure 2
183. Victoria University  1997 .01  .00  .01  .02 
184. Victoria University  1998 .00  .01  -.01  -.01 
185. Victoria University  1999 .00  .03  -.04  .00 
186. Victoria University  2000 .00  .04  -.04  -.01 
187. Victoria University  2001 .03  .07  -.04  .02 
188. Victoria University  2002 .03  .05  -.02  .03 




VICE-CHANCELLOR TENURE DATA 
 Institution  Year Time in office Age  Earnings  ( 1996 $’000) Retire DV = 1
1. Deakin  University  1995 3  50  30,266  0 
2. Northern  Territory  University  1995 6  52  12,691  0 
3.  University of Melbourne  1995 7  58  32,065  1 
4.  University of Sydney  1995 5  51  83,935  0 
5. James  Cook  University  1996 10  51  970  0 
6. Monash  University  1996 9  56  27,273  1 
7. Murdoch  University  1996 11  50  14,476  0 
8. Northern  Territory  University  1996 1  52  1,567  0 
9.  University of Adelaide  1996 2  52  17,881  0 
10.  University of New England  1996 2  55  5,106  0 
11.  University of South Australia  1996 4  51  2,038  0 
12.  University of Southern Queensland  1996 4  57  8,937  0 
13.  University of Technology Sydney  1996 10  52  4,060  0 
14.  Curtin University of Technology  1997 9  51  10,496  0 
15. Edith  Cowan  University  1997 4  58  3,364  0 
16. James  Cook  University  1997 1  47  -3,476  0 
17.  University of New England  1997 1  59  2,421  0 
18.  University of Western Australia  1997 7  58  37,093  1 
19.  University of Western Sydney  1998 4  52  2,055  0 
20. Australian  National  University  2000 6  58  7,846  0 
21. RMIT  2000 8  54  21,504  0 
22.  Southern Cross University  2000 7  49  6,302  0 
23.  University of Ballarat  2000 6  61  2,145  1 
24.  Charles Sturt University  2001 11  53  3,555  0 
25. Murdoch  University  2001 5  50  -2,134  0 
26. Deakin  University  2002 6  58  9,307  0 
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Table C3.2 
VICE-CHANCELLOR TENURE DATA (continued) 
 Institution  Year Time in office Age  Earnings  ( 1996 $’000) Retire DV = 1
27. Monash  University  2002 5  56  -541  0 
28.  University of Adelaide  2002 1  64  13,862  1 
29.  University of Canberra  2002 11  54  133  1 
30.  University of New South Wales  2002 10  52  46,000  0 
31.  University of Tasmania  2002 6  57  736  0 
32.  University of Technology Sydney  2002 6  54  17,534  0 
Source: University Annual Reports, Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
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Table C3.3 
VICE-CHANCELLOR APPOINTMENT DATA 
 
Institution Year
New VC External 
DV = 1  EFT Staff
Earnings 
(1996 $’000)
Old VC External 
DV = 1 
( ) log Assets  
(1996 $’000) Go8 DV = 1 
1. James Cook University  1996 0  1,231  970  1  12.54  0 
2. Murdoch University  1996 1  1,205  14,476  1  12.48  0 
3. University of Adelaide  1996 0  2,508  17,881  0  13.28  1 
4. University of New England  1996 1  1,285  5,106  1  12.86  0 
5. University of Newcastle  1996 1  2,005  13,926  0  13.09  0 
6. University of Queensland  1996 1  4,599  27,232  1  13.97  1 
7. University of South Australia  1996 0  2,167  2,038  1  13.51  0 
8. University of Southern Queensland  1996 0  940  8,937  1  11.84  0 
9. University of Sydney  1996 1  5,377  -2,307  1  14.82  1 
10. University of Tasmania  1996 1  1,712  10,988  1  12.85  0 
11. University of Technology Sydney  1996 0  1,735  4,060  1  13.00  0 
12. Curtin University of Technology  1997 0  2,097  10,496  1  13.12  0 
13. Edith Cowan University  1997 1  1,917  3,364  1  12.64  0 
14. James Cook University  1997 1  1,293  -3,476  0  12.61  0 
15. Monash University  1997 1  4,677  41,995  0  13.78  1 
16. University of New England  1997 1  1,184  2,421  1  12.81  0 
17. University of Western Australia  1998 1  2,379  30,540  1  13.93  1 
18. University of Western Sydney  1998 1  2,292  2,055  1  13.35  0 
19. RMIT  2000 0  3,090  21,504  0  13.97  0 
20. Southern Cross University  2000 1  620  6,302  1  11.87  0 
21. University of Ballarat  2000 1  739  2,145  0  12.22  0 
22. Australian National University  2001 1  3,071  52,257  0  14.15  1 
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Table C3.3 
VICE-CHANCELLOR APPOINTMENT DATA (continued) 
 
Institution Year
New VC External 
DV = 1  EFT Staff
Earnings 
(1996 $’000)
Old VC External 
DV = 1 
( ) log Assets  
(1996 $’000) Go8 DV = 1 
23. Charles Sturt University  2001 1  1,460  3,555  1  12.67  0 
24. University of Adelaide  2001 1  2,105  -4,909  0  13.33  1 
25. Monash University  2002 0  4,950  -541  1  14.03  1 
26. Murdoch University  2002 0  1,350  3,777  1  12.64  0 
27. University of Adelaide  2002 1  2,055  13,862  1  13.35  1 
28. University of Canberra  2002 1  972  133  1  12.09  0 
29. University of New South Wales  2002 1  5,192  46,000  0  14.19  1 
30. University of Tasmania  2002 1  1,751  736  1  12.66  0 
31. University of Technology Sydney  2002 0  1,899  17,534  0  13.52  0 
Source: University Annual Reports, AVCC, Who’s Who in Australia, University Vice-Chancelleries, Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
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Table C3.4 
DETERMINANTS OF VICE-CHANCELLOR REMUNERATION DATA 
Institution Year
( ) log Remuneration
(1996 $) 






( ) log House  
(1996 $)  Years
1.Australian National University  1998 12.58  14.20  29,410  4,526  12.02  5 
2.Curtin University of Technology  1998 12.06  13.25  6,024  1,260  12.06  2 
3.Edith Cowan University  1998 12.24  12.65  5,486  139  12.06  2 
4.Murdoch University  1998 12.51  12.55  11,108  1,001  12.06  3 
5.University of Adelaide  1998 12.44  13.42  6,343  6,562  11.86  3 
6.University of Ballarat  1998 12.35  12.20  7,347  94  11.64  6 
7.University of Canberra  1998 12.47  12.16  1,384  396  12.02  8 
8.University of New South Wales  1998 12.82  14.17  19,308  11,696  12.66  7 
9.University of Southern Queensland  1998 12.22  11.92  -1,134  191  12.06  3 
10.University of Western Australia  1998 12.51  13.93  30,540  4,585  12.06  1 
11.Victoria University  1998 12.58  13.07  241  204  12.10  8 
12.Australian National University  1999 12.60  14.25  4,886  8,270  12.17  6 
13.Edith Cowan University  1999 12.48  12.83  1,969  534  12.12  3 
14.Murdoch University  1999 12.50  12.56  2,844  1,565  12.12  4 
15.QUT 1999 12.67  13.33  8,150  1,785  11.73  11 
16.University of Adelaide  1999 12.42  13.43  3,385  11,763  11.89  4 
17.University of Ballarat  1999 12.38  12.20  3,734  347  11.57  7 
18.University of Canberra  1999 12.50  12.15  2,227  690  12.17  9 
19.University of New South Wales  1999 12.86  14.15  -2,957  21,568  12.80  8 
20.University of Southern Queensland  1999 12.20  11.93  -1,747  180  12.08  4 
21.University of Tasmania  1999 12.57  12.75  13,869  5,368  11.79  4 
22.University of Technology Sydney  1999 12.42  13.25  20,888  1,594  12.80  4 
23.University of Western Australia  1999 12.75  13.93  16,935  8,867  12.12  2 
24.Victoria University  1999 12.50  13.13  -2,302  613  12.21  9 
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Table C3.4 
DETERMINANTS OF VICE-CHANCELLOR REMUNERATION DATA (continued) 
Institution Year
( ) log Remuneration
(1996 $) 






( ) log House  
(1996 $)  Years
25.Australian  National  University  2000 12.64  14.24  7,846 8,764 12.18  7 
26.Curtin University of Technology  2000 12.76  13.21  -24,116  1,904  12.10  4 
27.Edith Cowan University  2000 12.48  12.81  -4,577  642  12.10  4 
28.Griffith  University  2000 12.67  13.40  34 3,777 11.73  16 
29.James  Cook  University  2000 12.36  12.73  17,289 3,545 12.09  4 
30.Macquarie  University  2000 13.02  13.43  24,546 6,988 12.83  14 
31.Murdoch  University  2000 12.48  12.57  -1,206 1,667 12.10  5 
32.QUT  2000 12.76  13.37  16,420 1,572 11.73  12 
33.Southern Cross University  2000 12.36  11.87  6,302  389  11.98  1 
34.University of Adelaide  2000 13.16  13.36  2,622  10,926  11.93  5 
35.University of Ballarat  2000 12.61  12.22  2,145  148  11.50  1 
36.University of Canberra  2000 12.48  12.15  3,101  409  12.18  10 
37.University of New England  2000 12.48  12.68  2,779  2,473  11.98  4 
38.University of New South Wales  2000 13.00  14.15  62,327  20,327  12.83  9 
39.University of Queensland  2000 13.33  14.33  11,900  17,015  11.73  5 
40.University of Southern Queensland  2000 12.36  11.92  -878  245  12.09  5 
41.University of Sydney  2000 13.00  14.78  24,984  24,718  12.83  5 
42.University of Tasmania  2000 12.55  12.74  -281  4,585  11.72  5 
43.University of Technology Sydney  2000 12.48  13.23  26,784  1,598  12.83  5 
44.University of Western Australia  2000 12.73  13.93  22,892  9,871  12.10  3 
45.University of Western Sydney  2000 12.79  13.37  14,319  2,191  11.98  3 
46.University of Wollongong  2000 12.67  12.84  4,860  3,653  11.98  6 
47.Victoria University  2000 12.53  13.11  -2,249  618  12.26  10 
48.Australian National University  2001 12.75  14.15  1,399,166  12,165  12.18  1 
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Table C3.4 
DETERMINANTS OF VICE-CHANCELLOR REMUNERATION DATA (continued) 
Institution Year
( ) log Remuneration
(1996 $) 






( ) log House  
(1996 $)  Years
49.Charles Sturt University  2001 12.45  12.67  318,650  20  11.97  1 
50.Deakin  University  2001 12.80  13.38  645,487 2,174 12.32  6 
51.Edith Cowan University  2001 12.64  12.80  360,677  543  12.10  5 
52.Griffith  University  2001 12.61  13.49  723,134 2,757 11.78  17 
53.James  Cook  University  2001 12.42  12.73  338,273 4,857 12.09  5 
54.Macquarie  University  2001 12.98  13.43  681,968 4,440 12.84  15 
55.Murdoch  University  2001 12.42  12.64  308,126 1,450 12.10  6 
56.RMIT 2001 12.58  13.97  1,167,497  110  12.32  2 
57.Southern Cross University  2001 12.26  11.84  139,268  196  11.97  2 
58.University of Adelaide  2001 14.18  13.33  614,123  8,057  11.98  1 
59.University of Ballarat  2001 12.12  12.25  208,779  289  11.57  2 
60.University of Canberra  2001 12.42  12.11  182,100  127  12.18  11 
61.University of New England  2001 12.49  12.69  323,811  924  11.97  5 
62.University of New South Wales  2001 13.00  14.19  1,454,441  17,524  12.84  10 
63.University of Queensland  2001 13.27  14.32  1,656,105  18,442  11.78  6 
64.University of Southern Queensland  2001 12.34  11.93  152,049  0  12.09  6 
65.University of Sydney  2001 13.00  14.79  2,640,274  23,112  12.84  6 
66.University of Tasmania  2001 12.52  12.69  325,706  2,778  11.65  6 
67.University of Technology Sydney  2001 12.55  13.41  664,001  2,014  12.84  6 
68.University of Western Australia  2001 12.75  13.90  1,092,871  9,161  12.10  4 
69.University of Western Sydney  2001 12.92  13.35  625,433  755  11.97  4 
70.University of Wollongong  2001 12.83  12.86  385,164  5,970  11.97  7 
71.Victoria University  2001 12.52  13.09  483,563  207  12.32  11 
72.Australian National University  2002 12.91  14.10  -10,227  35,463  12.37  2 
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Table C3.4 
DETERMINANTS OF VICE-CHANCELLOR REMUNERATION DATA (continued) 
Institution Year
( ) log Remuneration
(1996 $) 






( ) log House  
(1996 $)  Years
73.Charles Sturt University  2002 12.51  12.73  11,774  1,062  12.14  2 
74.Curtin University of Technology  2002 12.67  13.33  1,419  2,318  12.24  6 
75.Deakin  University  2002 12.94  13.41  9,307 1,589 12.50  7 
76.James  Cook  University  2002 12.46  12.83  6,854 1,325 12.31  6 
77.Macquarie  University  2002 12.98  13.60  34,826 4,521 13.02  16 
78.Murdoch  University  2002 12.59  12.64  3,777 1,108 12.24  7 
79.QUT  2002 12.80  13.22  18,792 2,464 11.98  14 
80.RMIT  2002 12.78  13.97  -376 2,002 12.50  3 
81.Southern Cross University  2002 12.91  12.07  1,832  177  12.14  3 
82.University of Adelaide  2002 12.42  13.35  13,862  7,205  12.18  1 
83.University of Ballarat  2002 12.23  12.28  9,224  539  11.80  3 
84.University of Canberra  2002 12.72  12.09  133  205  12.37  1 
85.University of New England  2002 12.49  12.73  4,102  2,044  12.14  6 
86.University of New South Wales  2002 12.46  14.19  46,000  17,025  13.02  1 
87.University of Queensland  2002 13.33  14.18  74,452  17,248  11.98  7 
88.University of Southern Queensland  2002 12.46  11.95  631  666  12.31  7 
89.University of Sydney  2002 12.98  14.80  58,123  24,570  13.02  7 
90.University of Tasmania  2002 12.19  12.66  736  4,401  11.77  1 
91.University of Technology Sydney  2002 12.75  13.52  17,534  2,780  13.02  1 
92.University of the Sunshine Coast  2002 12.35  10.95  1,029  0  12.31  7 
93.University of Western Australia  2002 13.09  13.88  -2,696  12,469  12.24  5 
94.University of Wollongong  2002 12.85  12.95  7,156  2,582  12.14  8 
95.Victoria University  2002 12.89  13.31  17,588  275  12.50  12 
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Table C3.4 
DETERMINANTS OF VICE-CHANCELLOR REMUNERATION DATA (continued) 
 Institution  Year Male DV = 1 Go8 DV = 1  Council  Enrol Staff EFTSU




1. Australian National University  1998 1  1  22  9,644 3,227 8,024 0  0 
2. Curtin University of Technology  1998 1  0  22  25,370 2,066 18,112 0  0 
3. Edith Cowan University  1998 0  0  20  19,742 1,916 13,417 0  0 
4. Murdoch University  1998 1  0  25  11,608 1,273 7,947 0  0 
5. University of Adelaide  1998 0  1  22  13,605 2,138 12,018 0  0 
6. University of Ballarat  1998 1  0  24  19,609 765 3,867 1  0 
7. University of Canberra  1998 1  0  20  9,060 865 7,212 0  0 
8. University of New South Wales  1998 1  1  21  31,548 5,197 23,067 0  0 
9. QUT  1998 1  0  23  19,208 943 9,806 1  0 
10. University of Western Australia  1998 1  1  25  13,999 2,379 11,972 0  0 
11. Victoria University  1998 1  0  25  56,276 1,950 13,412 0  0 
12. Australian National University  1999 1  1  22  9,648 2,904 8,373 0  0 
13. Edith Cowan University  1999 0  0  21  19,984 1,807 13,822 0  0 
14. Murdoch University  1999 1  0  23  12,066 1,277 8,581 0  0 
15. QUT  1999 1  0  23  29,304 3,001 22,632 0  0 
16. University of Adelaide  1999 0  1  21  13,429 2,120 11,672 0  0 
17. University of Ballarat  1999 1  0  23  19,492 756 3,979 1  0 
18. University of Canberra  1999 1  0  20  9,082 831 6,981 0  0 
19. University of New South Wales  1999 1  1  21  33,194 4,394 24,596 0  0 
20. University of Southern Queensland  1999 1  0  25  18,706 989 9,522 1  0 
21. University of Tasmania  1999 1  0  24  12,799 1,596 10,277 0  0 
22. University of Technology Sydney  1999 1  0  23  26,097 1,707 17,935 0  0 
23. University of Western Australia  1999 1  1  25  14,382 2,365 12,164 0  0 
24. Victoria University  1999 1  0  23  53,111 1,851 13,480 0  0 
25. Australian National University  2000 1  1  22  9,639 3,086 8,205 0  0 
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26. Curtin University of Technology  2000 1  0  21  27,007 2,227 19,969 0  0 
27. Edith Cowan University  2000 0  0  21  19,804 1,758 14,084 0  0 
28. Griffith University  2000 1  0  23  23,960 2,870 20,148 0  0 
29. James Cook University  2000 1  0  25  11,748 1,214 8,576 1  0 
30. Macquarie University  2000 0  0  21  21,622 1,623 15,787 0  0 
31. Murdoch University  2000 1  0  22  12,297 1,304 8,935 0  0 
32. QUT  2000 1  0  23  29,685 2,485 23,390 0  0 
33. Southern Cross University  2000 1  0  18  9,081 620 6,168 1  0 
34. University of Adelaide  2000 0  1  21  12,885 2,462 11,293 0  0 
35. University of Ballarat  2000 1  0  23  18,543 739 3,968 1  0 
36. University of Canberra  2000 1  0  21  9,058 828 6,901 0  0 
37. University of New England  2000 0  0  19  16,888 1,246 8,539 1  0 
38. University of New South Wales  2000 1  1  21  35,140 4,992 25,867 0  0 
39. University of Queensland  2000 1  1  35  29,717 4,462 25,371 0  0 
40. University of Southern Queensland  2000 1  0  26  19,134 1,036 9,488 1  0 
41. University of Sydney  2000 1  1  22  39,950 5,253 30,824 0  0 
42. University of Tasmania  2000 1  0  24  12,779 1,641 10,011 0  0 
43. University of Technology Sydney  2000 1  0  23  27,207 1,746 18,187 0  0 
44. University of Western Australia  2000 1  1  25  14,539 2,403 12,282 0  0 
45. University of Western Sydney  2000 0  0  18  28,875 2,277 24,693 1  0 
46. University of Wollongong  2000 1  0  18  13,067 1,552 10,639 1  0 
47. Victoria University  2000 1  0  23  52,506 1,931 13,463 0  0 
48. Australian National University  2001 1  1  22  9,794 3,071 8,425 0  8,323 
49. Charles Sturt University  2001 1  0  19  34,623 1,460 19,214 1  16,033 
50. Deakin University  2001 1  0  21  29,040 2,170 18,997 0  18,997 
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51. Edith Cowan University  2001 0  0  22  19,929 1,797 14,521 0  13,994 
52. Griffith University  2001 1  0  23  25,478 2,992 21,257 0  21,224 
53. James Cook University  2001 1  0  25  12,484 1,315 9,201 1  9,201 
54. Macquarie University  2001 0  0  21  24,194 1,596 16,752 0  16,292 
55. Murdoch University  2001 1  0  26  12,611 1,297 8,988 0  8,247 
56. RMIT  2001 0  0  22  55,596 3,205 26,054 0  22,998 
57. Southern Cross University  2001 1  0  19  10,147 634 6,662 1  6,349 
58. University of Adelaide  2001 1  1  20  13,603 2,105 11,908 0  11,841 
59. University of Ballarat  2001 1  0  23  21,614 760 4,455 1  4,021 
60. University of Canberra  2001 1  0  24  9,053 940 7,081 0  6,750 
61. University of New England  2001 0  0  19  17,225 1,180 8,709 1  8,478 
62. University of New South Wales  2001 1  1  21  37,563 4,866 27,724 0  27,682 
63. University of Queensland  2001 1  1  35  31,764 4,666 27,482 0  27,385 
64. University of Southern Queensland  2001 1  0  26  21,063 1,117 10,581 1  10,581 
65. University of Sydney  2001 1  1  22  39,982 5,199 31,733 0  31,526 
66. University of Tasmania  2001 1  0  17  12,820 1,675 10,166 0  10,047 
67. University of Technology Sydney  2001 1  0  23  27,605 1,820 19,705 0  19,495 
68. University of Western Australia  2001 1  1  22  15,035 2,447 12,757 0  12,593 
69. University of Western Sydney  2001 0  0  18  37,002 2,116 25,400 1  23,995 
70. University of Wollongong  2001 1  0  18  14,194 1,507 11,886 1  11,427 
71. Victoria University  2001 1  0  23  54,841 1,949 13,473 0  12,424 
72. Australian National University  2002 1  1  22  11,979 3,318 9,216 0  9,095 
73. Charles Sturt University  2002 1  0  19  34,746 1,448 20,808 1  17,162 
74. Curtin University of Technology  2002 1  0  20  33,591 2,445 22,731 0  19,798 
75. Deakin University  2002 1  0  21  29,512 2,215 19,900 0  19,321 
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76. James Cook University  2002 1  0  26  12,485 1,385 9,642 1  9,619 
77. Macquarie University  2002 0  0  21  27,674 1,674 17,852 0  17,397 
78. Murdoch University  2002 1  0  25  13,018 1,350 8,994 0  8,531 
79. QUT  2002 1  0  22  39,187 2,544 27,693 0  27,626 
80. RMIT  2002 0  0  22  57,243 3,405 27,468 0  23,597 
81. Southern Cross University  2002 1  0  19  11,234 614 7,177 1  6,344 
82. University of Adelaide  2002 1  1  21  15,064 2,055 12,915 0  12,693 
83. University of Ballarat  2002 1  0  23  21,277 797 4,937 1  4,315 
84. University of Canberra  2002 1  0  21  9,562 972 7,407 0  7,027 
85. University of New England  2002 0  0  19  18,573 1,146 9,433 1  9,139 
86. University of New South Wales  2002 1  1  21  40,731 5,192 29,857 0  29,541 
87. University of Queensland  2002 1  1  35  33,345 4,722 28,928 0  28,807 
88. University of Southern Queensland  2002 1  0  26  22,332 1,164 11,189 1  11,189 
89. University of Sydney  2002 1  1  22  42,450 5,309 33,907 0  33,637 
90. University of Tasmania  2002 1  0  17  13,972 1,751 10,924 0  10,812 
91. University of Technology Sydney  2002 1  0  25  27,618 1,899 20,461 0  19,983 
92. University of the Sunshine Coast  2002 1  0  23  3,451 281 2,642 1  2,642 
93. University of Western Australia  2002 1  1  21  15,396 2,559 12,936 0  12,667 
94. University of Wollongong  2002 1  0  18  19,762 1,607 13,825 1  12,512 
95. Victoria University  2002 1  0  23  56,292 2,014 13,698 0  13,667 
Source: University Annual Reports, AVCC, Who’s Who in Australia, University Vice-Chancelleries, Housing Industry Association, Australian Research Council, Department of 




DATA FOR CEOs 
 Company  Year
() log Remuneration  
(1996 $) 
( ) log Revenue  
(1996 $’000)  Turnover DV = 1
1.  Harvey Norman Holdings Ltd  1999 12.46  12.67  0 
2.  Brambles Industries Ltd  2000 15.92  15.42  0 
3.  Caltex Australia Ltd  2000 13.58  15.38  0 
4.  Coles Myer Ltd  2000 14.32  16.98  0 
5.  Mayne Group Ltd  2000 15.49  14.91  0 
6.  Melbourne IT Ltd  2000 13.07  10.65  0 
7.  Newcrest Mining Ltd  2000 13.87  13.41  0 
8. Onesteel  Ltd  2000 14.73  14.93  0 
9.  Alumina Ltd (previously WMC Ltd)  2001 15.97  14.96  0 
10. AMP  Ltd  2001 14.41  16.49  0 
11.  APN News & Media Ltd  2001 14.01  13.19  0 
12.  Austrim Nylex Ltd  2001 13.57  13.78  0 
13.  BHP Billiton Ltd  2001 16.82  17.35  0 
14. Billabong  International  Ltd  2001 12.54  12.76  0 
15. BRL  Hardy  Ltd  2001 13.90  13.44  0 
16.  Corporate Express Ltd  2001 13.87  13.25  0 
17. Energy  Developments  Ltd  2001 13.25  11.37  0 
18.  Flight Centre Ltd  2001 13.29  14.81  0 
19. Globe  International  Ltd  2001 13.10  11.84  0 
20.  Newcrest Mining Ltd  2001 13.79  13.25  0 
21.  Pacifica Group Ltd  2001 13.88  13.89  0 
22. Pasminco  Ltd  2001 13.94  14.61  1 
23.  Qantas Airways Ltd  2001 14.61  16.04  0 
24. Seven  Network  Ltd  2001 14.70  13.87  0 
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(1996 $) 
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(1996 $’000)  Turnover DV = 1
25.  Sims Group Ltd (formerly Simsmetal Ltd)  2001 15.18  14.01  0 
26.  SMS Management & Technology Ltd  2001 13.74  11.82  0 
27.  United Energy Ltd  2001 13.12  12.95  0 
28.  West Australian Newspapers Holdings Ltd  2001 15.10  12.59  0 
29.  Agro Investments Ltd  2002 12.77  11.09  0 
30.  Alumina Ltd (previously WMC Ltd)  2002 13.61  14.57  0 
31. Amcor  Ltd  2002 14.55  15.82  0 
32. AMP  Ltd  2002 16.25  15.77  0 
33.  Anaconda Nickel Ltd  2002 13.16  12.22  0 
34.  Ansell Ltd (former name: Pacific Dunlop Ltd)  2002 14.38  14.83  0 
35.  APN News & Media Ltd  2002 13.78  13.74  0 
36.  Aristocrat Leisure Ltd  2002 14.87  13.65  0 
37. AurionGold  Ltd  2002 13.21  12.93  1 
38.  Austar United Communications Ltd  2002 13.92  12.60  0 
39. Australand  Holdings  Ltd  2002 13.79  13.82  0 
40.  Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd  2002 14.74  16.20  0 
41.  Australian Gas Light Company (The)  2002 13.74  14.82  0 
42.  Australian Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd  2002 13.21  14.33  0 
43.  Australian Stock Exchange Ltd  2002 13.89  12.10  0 
44. AWB  Ltd  2002 13.65  14.46  0 
45.  AXA Asia Pacific Holdings Ltd  2002 14.78  13.98  0 
46.  Bank of Western Australia Ltd  2002 14.01  14.09  0 
47.  Baycorp Advantage Ltd (formerly: Data Advantage Ltd)  2002 13.50  11.57  0 
48.  Bendigo Bank Ltd  2002 13.13  13.08  0 
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49.  BHP Billiton Ltd  2002 16.57  17.09  0 
50. Boral  Ltd  2002 14.71  14.94  0 
51.  Brambles Industries Ltd  2002 14.87  15.97  0 
52. Brickworks  Ltd  2002 13.18  11.89  0 
53.  Caltex Australia Ltd  2002 13.76  15.93  0 
54.  Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd  2002 14.70  15.01  0 
55. Cochlear  Ltd  2002 13.64  12.43  0 
56.  Coles Myer Ltd  2002 14.45  16.96  0 
57.  Commonwealth Bank of Australia  2002 15.62  16.41  0 
58. Computershare  Ltd  2002 12.73  13.43  0 
59.  Corporate Express Ltd  2002 13.20  13.40  0 
60. CSL  Ltd  2002 15.70  13.98  0 
61. CSR  Ltd  2002 14.94  15.65  0 
62. David  Jones  Ltd  2002 13.63  14.22  0 
63. ecorp  Ltd  2002 13.31  10.50  0 
64.  Fairfax (John) Holdings Ltd  2002 13.87  13.85  0 
65. Futuris  Corporation  Ltd  2002 14.71  15.64  0 
66.  Goodman Fielder Ltd  2002 14.11  14.91  0 
67. GWA  International  Ltd  2002 13.83  13.19  0 
68.  Hutchison Telecommunications (Australia) Ltd  2002 14.01  12.21  0 
69.  Iluka Resources Ltd (former names Westralian Sands Ltd)  2002 13.61  13.61  0 
70. Incitec  Ltd  2002 14.08  13.66  0 
71.  Insurance Australia Group Ltd (formerly NRMA Insurance Group Ltd)  2002 14.62  14.86  0 
72.  James Hardie Industries N.V. (formerly James Hardie Industries Ltd)  2002 15.06  13.81  0 
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73. Jupiters  Ltd  2002 13.67  13.45  0 
74.  Lend Lease Corporation Ltd  2002 14.81  16.20  1 
75.  Mayne Group Ltd  2002 15.10  15.30  0 
76.  MIA Group Ltd  2002 12.82  12.62  0 
77.  Open Telecommunications Ltd  2002 13.92  9.81  1 
78.  Origin Energy Ltd (formerly Boral Ltd before demerger)  2002 14.22  14.57  0 
79. PaperlinX  Ltd  2002 14.06  14.84  0 
80. Pasminco  Ltd  2002 13.93  14.40  0 
81. Patrick  Corporation  2002 13.51  13.54  0 
82. PMP  Ltd  2002 13.79  14.09  0 
83. Powerlan  Ltd  2002 12.13  12.11  0 
84. PowerTel  Ltd  2002 13.10  11.40  0 
85.  Publishing And Broadcasting Ltd  2002 14.60  14.60  0 
86.  QBE Insurance Group Ltd  2002 14.56  15.48  0 
87.  Rio Tinto Ltd  2002 14.96  16.43  0 
88. Rural  Press  Ltd  2002 13.24  12.87  0 
89. Santos  Ltd  2002 14.53  14.11  0 
90. SecureNet  Ltd  2002 13.54  9.84  0 
91.  Sims Group Ltd (formerly Simsmetal Ltd)  2002 13.69  14.03  0 
92.  Smorgon Steel Group Ltd  2002 13.94  14.77  0 
93.  SMS Management & Technology Ltd  2002 11.96  11.65  0 
94.  Solution 6 Holdings Ltd  2002 13.75  12.55  0 
95.  Sonic Healthcare Ltd  2002 13.59  13.53  0 
96.  Sons of Gwalia Ltd  2002 13.32  13.03  0 
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97. Southcorp  Ltd  2002 14.45  14.71  0 
98.  Southern Pacific Petroleum NL  2002 13.03  10.27  0 
99.  Spotless Group Ltd  2002 14.76  14.46  0 
100.  St. George Bank Ltd  2002 14.08  15.05  0 
101. Suncorp-Metway  Ltd  2002 14.79  15.19  1 
102. TAB  Ltd  2002 13.92  13.57  0 
103.  Tabcorp Holdings Ltd  2002 15.19  14.35  1 
104.  Telstra Corporation Ltd  2002 14.55  16.71  0 
105.  Ten Network Holdings Ltd  2002 13.85  13.27  0 
106.  Toll Holdings Ltd  2002 13.86  14.41  0 
107. Transurban  Group  2002 14.29  11.52  0 
108.  United Energy Ltd  2002 14.35  13.19  0 
109.  Village Roadshow Ltd  2002 14.08  13.47  0 
110.  Washington H Soul Pattinson & Company Ltd  2002 12.77  12.74  0 
111. Wesfarmers  Ltd  2002 15.75  15.68  0 
112.  West Australian Newspapers Holdings Ltd  2002 12.81  12.47  0 
113. Westpac  Banking  Corporation  2002 14.96  16.19  0 
114. Woodside  Petroleum  Ltd  2002 14.66  14.52  0 
115. Woolworths  Ltd  2002 15.03  16.91  0 
116.  Foster's Group Ltd  2003 14.38  15.27  0 
117. Gunns  Ltd  2003 13.27  13.15  0 
118.  Kaz Group Ltd (Kaz Computer Services Ltd)  2003 12.57  12.62  0 
119.  Leighton Holdings Ltd  2003 15.85  15.26  0 
120. Macquarie  Bank  Ltd  2003 15.46  14.86  0 
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121.  Metcash Trading Ltd  2003 14.89  15.61  0 
122. Milton  Corporation  Ltd  2003 12.36  10.98  0 
123.  National Foods Ltd  2003 13.81  13.86  0 
124.  The News Corporation Ltd  2003 16.44  17.05  0 




DATA FOR VICE-CHANCELLORS 
 Institution  Year
( ) log Remuneration  
(1996 $) 
( ) log Revenue  
(1996 $’000)  Go8 DV = 1  Turnover DV = 1 
1.  Australian Catholic University  1995 12.22  11.17  0  0 
2. Australian  National  University  1995 12.41  13.01  1  0 
3.  Curtin University of Technology  1995 12.32  12.37  0  0 
4. Deakin  University  1995 12.70  12.35  0  1 
5. Edith  Cowan  University  1995 12.05  11.89  0  0 
6. James  Cook  University  1995 12.17  11.77  0  0 
7.  La Trobe University  1995 12.53  12.40  0  0 
8. Monash  University  1995 12.98  13.26  1  0 
9. Murdoch  University  1995 12.05  11.50  0  0 
10. RMIT  1995 12.57  12.79  0  0 
11.  Swinburne University of Technology  1995 12.32  11.83  0  0 
12. University  of  Adelaide  1995 12.41  12.43  0  0 
13. University  of  Canberra  1995 12.22  11.40  0  0 
14. University  of  Melbourne  1995 13.07  13.26  1  1 
15.  University of Western Australia  1995 12.30  12.52  1  0 
16.  Australian Catholic University  1996 12.32  11.19  0  0 
17. Australian  National  University  1996 12.45  12.96  1  0 
18.  Curtin University of Technology  1996 12.41  12.43  0  0 
19. Deakin  University  1996 12.18  12.34  0  0 
20. Edith  Cowan  University  1996 12.01  11.91  0  0 
21.  La Trobe University  1996 12.49  12.41  0  0 
22. Monash  University  1996 13.13  13.26  1  1 
23. Murdoch  University  1996 12.13  11.62  0  1 
24. RMIT  1996 12.63  12.82  0  0 
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( ) log Remuneration  
(1996 $) 
( ) log Revenue  
(1996 $’000)  Go8 DV = 1  Turnover DV = 1 
25.  Swinburne University of Technology  1996 12.41  11.87  0  0 
26. University  of  Adelaide  1996 12.13  12.51  0  0 
27. University  of  Ballarat  1996 12.18  10.84  0  0 
28. University  of  Canberra  1996 12.45  11.31  0  0 
29. University  of  Melbourne  1996 12.28  13.30  1  0 
30.  University of Western Australia  1996 12.35  12.56  1  0 
31. University  of  Canberra  1997 12.47  11.22  0  0 
32. Australian  National  University  1997 12.58  13.01  1  0 
33.  Curtin University of Technology  1997 12.11  12.45  0  1 
34. Deakin  University  1997 12.44  12.36  0  0 
35. Edith  Cowan  University  1997 12.11  11.96  0  1 
36.  La Trobe University  1997 12.58  12.42  0  0 
37. Monash  University  1997 12.74  13.25  1  0 
38. Murdoch  University  1997 12.31  11.68  0  0 
39. RMIT  1997 12.61  12.82  0  0 
40.  Swinburne University of Technology  1997 12.47  11.82  0  0 
41. University  of  Adelaide  1997 12.82  12.58  0  1 
42. University  of  Ballarat  1997 12.17  10.86  0  0 
43. University  of  Canberra  1997 12.47  11.34  0  0 
44. University  of  Melbourne  1997 12.65  13.34  1  0 
45.  University of New South Wales  1997 12.71  13.25  1  0 
46.  University of Western Australia  1997 13.10  12.59  1  1 
47. Victoria  University  1997 12.58  11.99  0  0 
48. Australian  National  University  1998 12.58  13.02  1  0 
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( ) log Remuneration  
(1996 $) 
( ) log Revenue  
(1996 $’000)  Go8 DV = 1  Turnover DV = 1 
49.  Curtin University of Technology  1998 12.06  12.54  0  0 
50. Deakin  University  1998 12.74  12.43  0  0 
51. Edith  Cowan  University  1998 12.24  11.95  0  0 
52.  La Trobe University  1998 12.65  12.43  0  0 
53. Monash  University  1998 12.85  13.29  1  0 
54. Murdoch  University  1998 12.51  11.73  0  0 
55.  Swinburne University of Technology  1998 12.51  12.09  0  0 
56. University  of  Adelaide  1998 12.44  12.61  0  0 
57. University  of  Ballarat  1998 12.35  11.32  0  0 
58. University  of  Canberra  1998 12.47  11.36  0  0 
59. University  of  Melbourne  1998 12.74  13.37  1  0 
60.  University of New South Wales  1998 12.82  13.31  1  0 
61.  University of Southern Queensland  1998 12.22  11.52  0  0 
62.  University of Western Australia  1998 12.51  12.62  1  0 
63. Victoria  University  1998 12.58  12.32  0  0 
64. Australian  National  University  1999 12.60  12.98  1  0 
65.  Central Queensland University  1999 12.67  11.73  0  0 
66.  Curtin University of Technology  1999 12.46  12.58  0  0 
67. Deakin  University  1999 12.75  12.50  0  0 
68. Edith  Cowan  University  1999 12.48  11.99  0  0 
69.  La Trobe University  1999 12.70  12.43  0  0 
70. Monash  University  1999 12.89  13.31  1  0 
71. Murdoch  University  1999 12.50  11.69  0  0 
72.  Queensland University of Technology  1999 12.67  12.58  0  0 
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DATA FOR VICE-CHANCELLORS (continued) 
 Institution  Year
( ) log Remuneration  
(1996 $) 
( ) log Revenue  
(1996 $’000)  Go8 DV = 1  Turnover DV = 1 
73.  Swinburne University of Technology  1999 12.53  12.11  0  0 
74. University  of  Adelaide  1999 12.42  12.61  0  0 
75. University  of  Ballarat  1999 12.38  11.32  0  0 
76. University  of  Canberra  1999 12.50  11.39  0  0 
77. University  of  Melbourne  1999 12.89  13.41  1  0 
78.  University of New South Wales  1999 12.86  13.27  1  0 
79. University  of  Newcastle  1999 12.50  12.29  0  0 
80.  University of Southern Queensland  1999 12.20  11.47  0  0 
81. University  of  Tasmania  1999 12.57  12.01  0  0 
82. University  of  Technology  Sydney  1999 12.42  12.45  0  0 
83.  University of Western Australia  1999 12.75  12.61  1  0 
84. Victoria  University  1999 12.50  12.34  0  0 
85. Australian  National  University  2000 12.64  12.97  1  0 
86.  Central Queensland University  2000 12.58  11.83  0  0 
87.  Charles Sturt University  2000 12.55  11.88  0  0 
88.  Curtin University of Technology  2000 12.76  12.59  0  0 
89. Deakin  University  2000 12.67  12.53  0  0 
90. Edith  Cowan  University  2000 12.48  11.94  0  0 
91. Griffith  University  2000 12.67  12.51  0  0 
92. James  Cook  University  2000 12.36  11.87  0  0 
93.  La Trobe University  2000 12.73  12.46  0  0 
94. Macquarie  University  2000 13.02  12.20  0  0 
95. Monash  University  2000 13.06  13.38  1  0 
96. Murdoch  University  2000 12.48  11.72  0  0 
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Table C3.6 
DATA FOR VICE-CHANCELLORS (continued) 
 Institution  Year
( ) log Remuneration  
(1996 $) 
( ) log Revenue  
(1996 $’000)  Go8 DV = 1  Turnover DV = 1 
97.  Queensland University of Technology  2000 12.76  12.61  0  0 
98. RMIT  2000 12.86  12.97  0  1 
99.  Southern Cross University  2000 12.36  11.30  0  1 
100.  Swinburne University of Technology  2000 12.51  12.22  0  0 
101. University  of  Adelaide  2000 13.16  12.58  0  0 
102. University  of  Ballarat  2000 12.61  11.35  0  1 
103. University  of  Canberra  2000 12.48  11.44  0  0 
104. University  of  Melbourne  2000 12.81  13.48  1  0 
105.  University of New England  2000 12.48  11.62  0  0 
106.  University of New South Wales  2000 13.00  13.33  1  0 
107. University  of  Newcastle  2000 12.48  12.13  0  0 
108. University  of  Queensland  2000 13.33  13.33  1  0 
109.  University of Southern Queensland  2000 12.36  11.50  0  0 
110. University  of  Sydney  2000 13.00  13.25  1  0 
111. University  of  Tasmania  2000 12.55  12.02  0  0 
112. University  of  Technology  Sydney  2000 12.48  12.49  0  0 
113.  University of Western Australia  2000 12.73  12.67  1  0 
114.  University of Western Sydney  2000 12.79  12.46  0  0 
115. University  of  Wollongong  2000 12.67  12.17  0  0 
116. Victoria  University  2000 12.53  12.37  0  0 
117. Australian  National  University  2001 12.75  13.04  1  1 
118.  Charles Sturt University  2001 12.45  12.07  0  1 
119.  Curtin University of Technology  2001 12.85  12.86  0  0 
120. Deakin  University  2001 12.80  12.55  0  0 
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Table C3.6 
DATA FOR VICE-CHANCELLORS (continued) 
 Institution  Year
( ) log Remuneration  
(1996 $) 
( ) log Revenue  
(1996 $’000)  Go8 DV = 1  Turnover DV = 1 
121. Edith  Cowan  University  2001 12.64  12.07  0  0 
122. Griffith  University  2001 12.61  12.56  0  0 
123. James  Cook  University  2001 12.42  11.91  0  0 
124.  La Trobe University  2001 12.80  12.50  0  0 
125. Macquarie  University  2001 12.98  12.44  0  0 
126. Monash  University  2001 12.96  13.37  1  0 
127. Murdoch  University  2001 12.42  11.81  0  1 
128.  Queensland University of Technology  2001 12.73  12.59  0  0 
129. RMIT  2001 12.58  12.98  0  0 
130.  Southern Cross University  2001 12.26  11.28  0  0 
131.  Swinburne University of Technology  2001 12.61  12.26  0  0 
132. University  of  Adelaide  2001 14.18  12.59  0  1 
133. University  of  Ballarat  2001 12.12  11.46  0  0 
134. University  of  Canberra  2001 12.42  11.45  0  0 
135. University  of  Melbourne  2001 12.92  13.53  1  0 
136.  University of New England  2001 12.49  11.89  0  0 
137.  University of New South Wales  2001 13.00  13.54  1  0 
138. University  of  Newcastle  2001 12.52  12.37  0  0 
139. University  of  Queensland  2001 13.27  13.38  1  0 
140.  University of Southern Queensland  2001 12.34  11.57  0  0 
141. University  of  Sydney  2001 13.00  13.51  1  0 
142. University  of  Tasmania  2001 12.52  12.01  0  0 
143. University  of  Technology  Sydney  2001 12.55  12.57  0  0 
144.  University of the Sunshine Coast  2001 12.42  10.32  0  0 
   Continued next page… 
194 
Table C3.6 
DATA FOR VICE-CHANCELLORS (continued) 
 Institution  Year
( ) log Remuneration  
(1996 $) 
( ) log Revenue  
(1996 $’000)  Go8 DV = 1  Turnover DV = 1 
145.  University of Western Australia  2001 12.75  12.66  1  0 
146.  University of Western Sydney  2001 12.92  12.54  0  0 
147. University  of  Wollongong  2001 12.83  12.28  0  0 
148. Victoria  University  2001 12.52  12.40  0  0 
149. Australian  National  University  2002 12.91  12.94  1  0 
150.  Central Queensland University  2002 12.35  12.10  0  0 
151.  Charles Sturt University  2002 12.51  12.11  0  0 
152.  Curtin University of Technology  2002 12.67  12.68  0  0 
153. Deakin  University  2002 12.94  12.59  0  1 
154. Edith  Cowan  University  2002 12.75  12.10  0  0 
155. James  Cook  University  2002 12.46  11.93  0  0 
156.  La Trobe University  2002 12.78  12.54  0  0 
157. Macquarie  University  2002 12.98  12.60  0  0 
158. Monash  University  2002 13.82  13.44  1  1 
159. Murdoch  University  2002 12.59  11.84  0  0 
160.  Queensland University of Technology  2002 12.80  12.67  0  0 
161. RMIT  2002 12.78  13.07  0  0 
162.  Southern Cross University  2002 12.91  11.34  0  0 
163.  Swinburne University of Technology  2002 12.59  12.26  0  0 
164. University  of  Adelaide  2002 12.42  12.69  0  0 
165. University  of  Ballarat  2002 12.23  11.44  0  0 
166. University  of  Canberra  2002 12.72  11.38  0  1 
167. University  of  Melbourne  2002 13.00  13.63  1  0 
168.  University of New England  2002 12.49  11.60  0  0 
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Table C3.6 
DATA FOR VICE-CHANCELLORS (continued) 
 Institution  Year
( ) log Remuneration  
(1996 $) 
( ) log Revenue  
(1996 $’000)  Go8 DV = 1  Turnover DV = 1 
169.  University of New South Wales  2002 12.46  13.57  1  1 
170. University  of  Newcastle  2002 12.52  12.43  0  0 
171. University  of  Queensland  2002 13.33  13.59  1  0 
172.  University of Southern Queensland  2002 12.46  11.55  0  0 
173. University  of  Sydney  2002 12.98  13.57  1  0 
174. University  of  Tasmania  2002 12.19  12.07  0  1 
175. University  of  Technology  Sydney  2002 12.75  12.63  0  0 
176.  University of the Sunshine Coast  2002 12.35  10.25  0  0 
177.  University of Western Australia  2002 13.09  12.66  1  0 
178. University  of  Wollongong  2002 12.85  12.39  0  0 
179. Victoria  University  2002 12.89  12.41  0  0 
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